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Introduction
IN HUDSON V MICHIGAN, the United States Supreme Court held
that the "exclusionary rule"2 does not require the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the "knock and announce" rule. 3 The
knock and announce rule has generally required police officers exe-
cuting a warrant at a person's home to knock and announce their
presence prior to any forcible entry into the home.4 Only after being
denied entry, or if other necessary justifications exist, can police forci-
bly enter the home. 5 Prior to Hudson, evidence obtained in violation
of this rule was excluded from use at trial against the defendant in the
prosecution's case in chief.6 In Hudson, however, the Supreme Court
held that violation of the knock and announce rule does not require
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1. 126 S. Ct. 2159, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
2. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the United States Supreme Court
first articulated the principle that has become known as the federal exclusionary rule-
that unconstitutionally-obtained evidence is inadmissible in a trial against a defendant in
the prosecution's case in chief.
3. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.
4. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) for the requirement that officers
knock and announce their presence prior to any forcible entry into a residence. See also
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), where the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the statutory requirement of announcement found in 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958).
5. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 927.
6. See id. at 929, 934 (holding that the "'knock and announce' principle forms a part
of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment," and "an officer's unan-
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the suppression of all evidence found in the search.7 Although the
Court upheld the knock and announce rule and continued to require
police to knock and announce their presence prior to executing a
warrant in a home,8 the Court also held that if police do not follow
the rule, the evidence obtained is still admissible against the suspect at
trial.9
This decision seems to contradict decades of precedent holding
that evidence unconstitutionally obtained is inadmissible against a sus-
pect at trial,10 as well as precedent specifically holding that evidence
obtained in violation of the knock and announce rule is inadmissi-
ble."1 The Fourth Amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and
seizures."1 2 The knock and announce rule has been held to form "part
of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment,"' 3 plac-
ing limitations on how or the manner in which the police may execute
a search or seizure in a suspect's home.14 Prior to the Hudson holding,
failure to comply with the knock and announce rule made a search or
seizure unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional.' 5
The remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures has tradition-
ally been the exclusion of the evidence from trial, referred to as the
nounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment," mak-
ing it subject to the exclusionary rule).
7. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.
8. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(stating that "[t]he Court's decision should not be interpreted as suggesting that violations
of the [knock and announce] requirement are trivial or beyond the law's concern").
9. See zd. at 2168 (majority) (holding that violation of the knock and announce rule
did not require the suppression of all evidence found in the search).
10. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the United States Supreme
Court first "adopted the federal exclusionary rule for evidence that was unlawfully seized
from a home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Hudson, 126 S. Ct.
at 2163; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (holding that "all evidence ob-
tained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court").
11. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968) (holding that because of-
ficers entered without a proper knock and announcement, the subsequent arrest was inva-
lid and the evidence seized in the subsequent search was inadmissible); Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (holding that because "the petitioner did not receive
that notice before the officers broke the door to invade his home, the arrest was unlawful,
and the evidence seized should have been suppressed"); see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 929 (1995); United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000).
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
13. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.
14. See id. at 934.
15. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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exclusionary rule.16 In Hudson, however, the Court revisited this pre-
cedent and held that the exclusionary rule does not automatically ap-
ply whenever there is a technical constitutional violation. 17 The Court
carefully considered the historical purpose and scope of the rule, and
it determined that the exclusionary rule is only applicable after apply-
ing a "cost/benefit analysis"18 and finding that the deterrent benefits
of the rule outweigh the social costs of exclusion. 19 Applying this anal-
ysis, the Hudson Court held the evidence obtained in violation of the
knock and announce rule was admissible because its exclusion would
not further the deterrent goal of the exclusionary rule.20
The cost/benefit analysis is not a new test to determine when the
exclusionary rule will apply-it has been used for years prior to Hud-
son.2 1 The Hudson Court applied the same test historically used in ex-
clusionary rule precedent, but it arrived at a different result than in
the past due to a number of modern day factors like new civil reme-
dies and increased police professionalism.2 2 These factors change the
outcome of the Hudson cost/benefit analysis because of their impact
on the deterrent benefit of applying the exclusionary rule.
Similarly, the cost/benefit analysis has been used to establish a
number of exceptions to the exclusionary rule-situations in which
16. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), where the United States Su-
preme Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule for evidence that was unlawfully seized
from a home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
17. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006).
18. See full discussion infta Part V.
19. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168, for application of the cost/benefit analysis,
whereby the Court weighs the costs of application of the rule against the benefits of its
application to help determine whether exclusion of the evidence is warranted. See also Pa.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (holding that the exclusionary rule
is only applicable "where its deterrent benefits outweighs its substantial social costs").
20. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-68 where the Court held the social costs of apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations are considerable. "Resort to
the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified." Id. at 2168.
21. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. Although the Court did not expressly state the purpose
of the exclusionary rule in its first application of the rule, deterrence has prevailed as the
primary purpose of the rule. The cost/benefit analysis had early application for determin-
ing whether the exclusionary rule was appropriately applied. See, e.g., United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (specifically acknowledging use of the cost/benefit
analysis to determine whether application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate); Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (holding that application of exclusion-
ary rule would turn on balancing costs and benefits of exclusion); see also James
Stribopoulos, Lessons From the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American Exclusionary Rule
Debate, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 101-110 (discussing the evolution of deterrence
as the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule and how courts use the cost/benefit analy-
sis to determine when to apply the exclusionary rule).
22. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166-68.
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the evidence may still be admissible at trial even though there has
been a technical constitutional violation. 23 In concluding that these
situations do not warrant exclusion of the evidence, the Supreme
Court, as in Hudson, determined that the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule was not furthered, and application of the rule was
therefore not warranted.24
Thus, Hudson is not new law. In holding that evidence obtained
in violation of the knock and announce rule is admissible, the Hudson
Court did not overrule exclusionary rule precedent. Instead, Hudson
applies the same principles that have always been used to determine
the admissibility of evidence, but it reached a different result than in
previous knock and announce cases 25 due to changes in society.
The purpose of this Article is to examine other instances where
the Court has historically held evidence inadmissible to determine
whether such evidence should now be admissible in light of the Hud-
son analysis. In particular, it examines two "good faith" exceptions to
the exclusionary rule-situations when an officer reasonably relies on
a warrant later held inadmissible2 6 or upon a statute later held inva-
lid.27 Applying Hudson's cost/benefit analysis, the purpose and goal of
the exclusionary rule is not furthered by excluding evidence that was
obtained when an officer reasonably relied upon a warrant or statute,
23. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537-39 (1988) (applying the inevitable
discovery doctrine to admit evidence at trial and also using components of the cost/benefit
analysis, including the "incentive" to commit the illegal act); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
442-44 (1984) (establishing the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule
after finding that circumstances did not warrant the "socially costly course" of exclusion);
see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963) (applying the attenuated or purged taint exception to the exclusionary
rule to admit evidence); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920).
24. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454
(1976) (holding that "if ... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deter-
rence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted").
25. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968) (holding that because of-
ficers entered without a proper knock and announcement, the subsequent arrest was inva-
lid, and the evidence seized in the subsequent search was inadmissible); Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (holding that because "the petitioner did not receive
that notice before the officers broke the door to invade his home, the arrest was unlawful,
and the evidence seized should have been suppressed"); see also United States v. Dice, 200
F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000).
26. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule when an officer reasonably relies upon a warrant later held
inadmissible).
27. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1987) (establishing the good faith ex-




even when certain exceptions to the good faith exceptions exists. 28
Under these circumstances, the officer has acted reasonably in relying
upon such authority vested in him or her by a warrant or statute, so
excluding the evidence obtained will have little deterrent effect on his
or her future conduct. Since exclusion would not further the deter-
rent goals of the rule, the evidence should be admissible under Hud-
son's cost/benefit analysis.
Admitting evidence obtained when the exceptions to the good
faith exceptions exist appears to contradict decades of precedent
holding this evidence inadmissible at trial. 29 Nevertheless, this Article
re-examines this precedent using the principles set out in Hudson, and
it argues that since the deterrent benefit of admitting the evidence
outweighs the social costs, the exclusionary rule should not be ap-
plied. Like Hudson, admitting this evidence would lead to a different
result than in the prior cases on this issue, but it would not change the
underlying law.
In addressing these issues, Part I of this Article discusses the rea-
sonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Part II discusses
the knock and announce rule, and it explains how the rule forms a
part of the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Part III discusses the exclusionary rule and explains the circumstances
under which it is applied. This section explains the cost/benefit analy-
sis, and it demonstrates how courts have used this analysis to develop
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Part IV discusses how the Hud-
son Court used the cost/benefit analysis to determine that the exclu-
sionary rule is not the appropriate remedy for a knock and announce
violation. Part V applies the Hudson cost/benefit analysis to the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule when an officer reasonably
relies upon a warrant, and it argues that the exclusionary rule is not
the appropriate remedy when the exceptions to this good faith excep-
tion exist. Part VI similarly applies the cost/benefit analysis to the
28. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (setting out exceptions to the good faith exception when
an officer relies on a warrant: (1) misleading information; (2) abandonment of judicial
role; (3) affidavit clearly insufficient to establish probable cause; and (4) facially deficient
warrant); see also Krull, 480 U.S. at 349, 355 (setting forth exceptions to the good faith
exception when an officer relies on statutory authority: (1) when the "legislature wholly
abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws," and (2) "when a reasonable of-
ficer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional").
29. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988-89
(1989) (upholding execution of warrant where the warrant was not facially deficient, and
officers reasonably relied upon judge's actions); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (indicating that warrant was clearly insufficient to
establish probable cause).
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good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when an officer reasona-
bly relies upon statutory authority later held invalid, and it also dem-
onstrates that the exclusionary rule is not the appropriate remedy
when the exceptions to this good faith exception exist.
I. The Reasonableness Requirement of the Fourth
Amendment
Hudson deals with the remedy for violation of the knock and an-
nounce rule.30 The knock and announce rule has been held to form a
part of the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.3 1
An analysis of the proper remedy for violation of the knock and an-
nounce rule begins with pinpointing how and why violation of the
rule is an unreasonable search and seizure. 32
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.33
The amendment contains two separate clauses: (1) the Reasona-
bleness Clause, and (2) the Warrant Clause.34
The Reasonableness Clause sets forth the requirement that
searches and seizures by the government must be reasonable. 35 If
there is no search or seizure within the Fourth Amendment's mean-
ing, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, and there is no re-
quirement of reasonableness.
30. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006).
31. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
32. With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has
only applied the exclusionary rule to unreasonable searches and seizures as a remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). As a
result, determining whether the exclusionary rule applies begins by determining whether
the conduct was unreasonable, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Only then must the Court
determine whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. Id.; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980) (holding that the Amend-
ment contains "two separate clauses, the first protecting the basic right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and the second requiring that warrants be particular
and supported by probable cause").
35. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 (D. Mass. 2007); see also Payton,
445 U.S. at 584.
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The second clause, the Warrant Clause, sets forth the require-
ment for compliance with the reasonableness clause-a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause-and also includes the requirements for a
valid warrant.3 6 Searches and seizures without a warrant are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few
specifically-established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement.3 7 The judicially-created exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement are circumstances where there was no warrant, but the gov-
ernment conduct was still reasonable and therefore satisfied the
Fourth Amendment. 38 Some of these exceptions require probable
cause, and some do not.39 The primary basis upon which the courts
have found the government conduct to be reasonable, even without a
warrant, has been by applying a balancing test where the courts weigh
the level of intrusiveness of the government activity involved against
the government interest furthered by conducting the activity in ques-
tion.40 For "there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the inva-
sion which the search [or seizure] entails. ' '41 Courts have held the ac-
tivity is reasonable when the government's interest outweighs the level
of intrusiveness into one's individual liberty.4 2
36. Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of
criminal wrongdoing, the Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the ob-
taining of a judicial warrant. Warrants cannot be issued, of course, without the showing of
probable cause as required by the Warrant Clause. But a warrant is not required to estab-
lish the reasonableness of all government searches; when a warrant is not required (and
the Warrant Clause therefore not applicable), probable cause is not invariably required
either. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); see also Flippo v. West Virginia,
528 U.S. 11 (1999); Payton, 445 U.S. at 584.
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
38. Although the Court usually requires that a search be undertaken only pursuant to
a warrant (and thus supported by probable cause, as per the Constitution), the Court has
established a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement upon an ultimate finding
of reasonableness. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 573, 590 (setting forth the exigent circumstances
exception); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(indicating that the Court has permitted exceptions when "special needs, beyond the nor-
mal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable").
39. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (holding that probable cause
justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (holding
that no probable cause is required for a "stop and frisk"); Louisiana v. Sims, 426 So. 2d 148
(La. 1983) (holding that no probable cause is required for the inventory exception).
40. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 15
(holding search and seizure valid by applying a balancing test).
41. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
42. See id.; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
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So, whether it is by a warrant or an exception to the warrant re-
quirement, the search or seizure is constitutional if the conduct is rea-
sonable. 43 The Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment thus
predominates over the Warrant Clause. 44 This principle is the basis for
an analysis of the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
knock and announce rule, and it also serves as the basis for determin-
ing the admissibility of evidence when the good faith exceptions to
the exclusionary rule are present. It establishes that if the conduct in
question is ultimately deemed reasonable, then the evidence is admis-
sible at trial.
H. The Knock and Announce Rule
A. Overview of the Rule
The reasonableness of a search or seizure does not only go to
when the search or seizure occurs, i.e., whether probable cause exists,
but also to the manner in which the search or seizure is executed or
"how it is carried out."45 Courts have found searches and seizures un-
constitutional, even when probable cause existed, when police used
excessive or unnecessary force. 46 Similarly, the knock and announce
rule focuses on how an arrest should be executed when the police,
armed with a warrant supported by probable cause, are arresting an
individual in his or her home. The United States Supreme Court has
held that the knock and announce principle "forms a part of the rea-
sonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment, '47 and "in some
circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment," 48 even with a warrant
supported by probable cause.
Consequently, courts have placed limitations on the execution of
an arrest at one's home due to the added constitutional protections
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
44. This conclusion is based on the many exceptions to the warrant requirement,
each with an ultimate finding of reasonableness, even though there was no warrant. See
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobile exception to warrant requirement);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to a lawful arrest); Teny, 392
U.S. at 1 (stop and frisk exception to warrant requirement).
45. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
46. See id. at 1-2, where the United States Supreme Court held a statute unconstitu-
tional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against an apparently unarmed, non-
dangerous fleeing suspect.
47. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
48. Id. at 934.
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surrounding the sanctity of one's home.49 The knock and announce
rule, a long standing common law rule that has been codified in most
states and by the federal government, provides that police may break
into a person's home to execute a warrant only after they have given
notice of their purpose and authority and have been refused entry.50
After knocking and announcing their presence and authority, police
must wait a reasonable time before forcibly entering the residence.5'
The Court has held that the amount of time an officer should delay
"depends largely on factual determinations made by the trial court."52
Courts have upheld the validity of searches where the delay was one
minute, thirty seconds, fifteen to twenty seconds, and ten seconds.53
Noncompliance with the rule may present itself in various forms.
It might include: (1) failing to knock and announce all together; 54 (2)
failing to wait a reasonable amount of time after announcement prior
to forcibly entering;55 or (3) using unnecessary or an unreasonable
amount of force to make the entry after refusal.56
The knock and announce rule recognizes many situations when it
is unnecessary to knock and announce. 57 It is not necessary when "cir-
cumstances present a threat of physical violence," or if there is "reason
to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice
were given. '15 Furthermore, the knock and announce requirement is
not required if knocking and announcing would be futile. 59 Under
these circumstances failure to knock and announce will not result in
an unreasonable search or seizure. Police need only "'have a reasona-
ble suspicion ... under the particular circumstances' that one of these
grounds for failing to knock announce exists."60
49. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (holding that "physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed").
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958), where the rule has been codified in federal law. See
also state laws codifying the provision: LA. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 224 (2007); ALA.
CODE § 15-5-9 (2007).
51. See United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 983 (6th Cir. 2000).
52. United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 384; see also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 40-41 (2003) (holding that
fifteen to twenty seconds was enough time to wait before forcing entry to serve a narcotics
search warrant).
54. See Dice, 200 F.3d at 983.
55. Id.
56. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 935-36 (1994).
57. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162-63 (2006).
58. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
59. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
60. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163 (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394).
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B. How the Knock and Announce Rule Helps to Establish
Reasonableness
The plain language of the Fourth Amendment specifically lists
"houses" as a place protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 6 1 "The right of the people to be secure in their... houses...
shall not be violated."62 That language unequivocally establishes that
"[a] t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasona-
ble governmental intrusion."63 The United States Supreme Court has
reiterated that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. ' 64 Because
of these added protections surrounding the home, courts have care-
fully crafted procedures, such as the knock and announce rule, for
entry into residences even when police possess a warrant.65
This knock and announce rule serves to protect a number of in-
terests. "One of those interests is the protection of human life and
limb."' 66 Knocking before entering could prevent bodily injury to the
police, who may be retaliated against "in supposed self defense by the
surprised resident" if the occupants do not realize it is police who are
entering the home.6 7 It may further prevent injury to the occupants
themselves if police are forced to defend themselves. 68 Another inter-
est is the protection of property. 69 The knock and announce rule gives
individuals the opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the
destruction of property occasioned by a forcible entry.70 Knocking
avoids unnecessary alarm to the occupants, and it could actually facili-
tate and speed up the search process. 7 1 Finally, "the knock-and-an-
nounce rule protects those elements of privacy and dignity that can be
destroyed by a sudden entrance. '7 2 It gives residents the opportunity
to prepare themselves for the police entry.7 3 Whether it is to "pull on
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62. Id.
63. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
64. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
65. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995), for explanation of the knock
and announce rule.
66. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 (1948).
69. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
70. Id.
71. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
72. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
73. Id.
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clothes or get out of bed,"74 having a few moments notice to prepare
prior to police entry helps to protect the dignity and sanctity associ-
ated with the home.
The knock and announce rule promotes reasonableness because
it helps to avoid property damage, bodily injury, and death; it also
helps to actually facilitate the goal of the official police presence. Be-
cause of these benefits and added protections of the knock and an-
nounce rule, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
"'knock and announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. '7 5 Therefore, in general,
searches and seizures conducted without compliance with the knock
and announce rule are unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 76
Non-compliance with the knock and announce rule is thus tech-
nically an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.77 Courts have created a remedy for unreasonable
searches and seizures-the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule,
however, is not automatically applied in every instance in which there
has been a technical constitutional violation, i.e., just because there
has been an unreasonable search or seizure. An examination of the
exclusionary rule demonstrates how the cost/benefit analysis is used
to determine when unconstitutionally-obtained evidence should be
excluded from trial.
HI. The Exclusionary Rule and Exceptions
A. Overview of the Rule
Although the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable
searches and seizures, it does not set forth a remedy for its violation.
The exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy for constitutional
violations. In Mapp v. Ohio,78 the Court held that "all evidence ob-
tained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is...
inadmissible in . . . court. '79
74. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997).
75. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
76. See id. at 934.
77. See id. at 929 (holding that noncompliance with the knock and announce rule
makes the search or seizure unreasonable).
78. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. Id. at 655.
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B. When is the Exclusionary Rule Applied?
An evaluation of the full scope of the exclusionary rule's applica-
tion is necessary in this Article in order to: (1) analyze whether it is
properly applied to a knock and announce violation; and (2) to deter-
mine whether it should be applied when the exceptions to the good
faith exceptions exist.
Violation of the Fourth Amendment does not always warrant ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule.80 The rule is not automatically ap-
plied for every technical constitutional violation; it will not be applied
merely because there is a "causal connection with police miscon-
duct."81 The Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule gen-
erates substantial social costs, which sometimes include "setting the
guilty free and the dangerous at large. '8 2 As a result, the Court has
been "cautious [in] expanding it."83 Therefore, careful consideration
of the circumstances surrounding the application of the rule is neces-
sary in order to determine when the rule is properly applied to a tech-
nical constitutional violation.8 4
The United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary
rule "applies only in contexts 'where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served.' "85 Thus, application of the rule is
only warranted when the rule's underlying purpose is furthered.
There have been various purposes for the rule advanced in the past
several decades. 86 Deterrence, however, has prevailed as the primary,
and perhaps most compelling, purpose.8 7
The Court has stressed that the prime purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule is to deter future unlawful police conduct.88 The rule is not
80. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
81. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).
82. Id. at 2163.
83. Id. (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)).
84. See id. at 2164 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (quoting United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
86. See United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (D. Or. 2003)
(holding that the purposes of the exclusionary rule are "deterrence and judicial integ-
rity"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 260 n.14 (1983); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960).
87. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 260 (1983) (holding that "recent opinions of the
Court make clear that the primary function of the exclusionary rule is to deter violations of
the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (holding that
the prime purpose of the rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future unlawful police
conduct).
88. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (holding that application of the exclu-
sionary rule may not be appropriate if it would have little deterrent effect on future police
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designed to cure the harm already suffered by the defendant.89 Since
the Fourth Amendment violation is said to have been fully accom-
plished at the time the illegal search or seizure occurs, excluding the
evidence cannot "cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he
has already suffered." 90 Therefore, the objective of the rule is reme-
dial, and application of the rule is only appropriate when the reme-
dial objective of deterrence is furthered.9 1
C. The Cost/Benefit Analysis
To determine when the goal of deterrence is sufficiently fur-
thered to warrant application of the exclusionary rule, courts use what
is commonly referred to as the cost/benefit analysis.9 2 The cost/bene-
fit analysis is a balancing test whereby the extent or degree to which
application of the rule advances the deterrent benefit of exclusion is
weighed against the social costs of exclusion. The exclusionary rule
has only been applied "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'sub-
stantial social costs.'" 93
In criminal trials, the most obvious cost in applying the exclusion-
ary rule is the exclusion of reliable evidence that may result in "setting
the guilty free and the dangerous at large. '94 Another cost is the loss
of respect for the criminal justice system when defendants are set free
based on what the public may view as a "technicality. '9 5 Furthermore,
it is often said that the exclusionary rule only protects those who are
guilty and offers no meaningful protection to those who are inno-
cent.96 Police may have no deterrent incentive to forgo an intrusion
misconduct, "which is the basic purpose of the rule"); see also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348
(holding that the exclusionary rule is a 'judicially created means of deterring illegal
searches and seizures").
89. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
90. Id.
91. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 358 (1998).
92. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (specifi-
cally acknowledging use of the cost/benefit analysis to determine whether application of
the exclusionary rule is appropriate); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75
(1969) (holding that application of the exclusionary rule would turn on balancing the
costs and benefits of exclusion).
93. Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (White, J. dissenting) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907).
94. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)).
95. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91 (1976); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 259
n.14 (1983).
96. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 268 n. 26 (1973) ("The use of the
exclusionary rule imposes excessive costs on the criminal justice system. It provides no
recompense for the innocent and it frees the guilty.").
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upon the individual rights of an innocent person where they do not
seek or expect to find evidence of a crime. 97 Additionally, it is argued
that the rule does not provide for any direct sanction to the individual
official whose illegal conduct results in the exclusion of evidence. 98
Courts also experience "extensive litigation to determine whether par-
ticular evidence must be excluded."99 Finally, application of the rule
may in some cases result in opening the floodgates of litigation and
become, in effect, a "get-out-of-jail-free card." 100
The other prong of the cost/benefit analysis involves an examina-
tion of the benefits associated with excluding unconstitutionally-ob-
tained evidence. The most important benefit and goal of the
exclusionary rule is its deterrent effect- the rule is designed to "deter
future unlawful police conduct."101 It is intended to discourage police
from engaging in unlawful conduct in the future by taking away the
incentive for the unlawful activity. If police know that unconstitution-
ally-obtained evidence will not be admitted at trial, the officers are less
likely to engage in the unconstitutional conduct. 10 2
There are two other important considerations in the analysis of
the deterrent benefit of the rule. The first is an analysis of "the
strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act."103 The ques-
tion of balancing the deterrent benefit of excluding evidence involves
addressing how likely it is that police would want or need to engage in
such conduct in order to obtain the evidence in the first place. The
court will thus examine whether application of the exclusionary rule is
needed to deter police from such conduct, or if the conduct in ques-
tion is of the type that police will have little if any incentive to engage
in it.1°4 For example, if police have much more to lose than to gain
from the illegality, they will not likely engage in such conduct. If the
incentive to violate the rule is small, then this would lessen the deter-
rent benefit of applying the exclusionary rule. The other important
97. Id.
98. See id. at 267 ("The exclusionary rule has occasioned much criticism, largely on
grounds that its application permits guilty defendants to go free and law-breaking officers
to go unpunished.").
99. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
100. Id. at 2159.
101. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987).
102. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(indicating that the exclusionary rule, as an adjunct to the Fourth Amendment, seeks to
deter unconstitutional police conduct and to avoid compromising the integrity of the
courts by use of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence).




factor in analyzing the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule in-
volves whether other forms of deterrence exist, such as civil suits or
internal police discipline. 10 5 Both of these factors are important in
helping the court determine the overall deterrent benefit of exclu-
sion. They help determine whether the exclusionary rule is needed to
deter police misconduct. If the incentive to commit the crime is mini-
mal or if there are other deterrents, then this decreases the deterrent
effect of excluding evidence.
D. The Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of the
Cost/Benefit Analysis
The Supreme Court has applied the cost/benefit analysis to vari-
ous types of police conduct and developed exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule. 10 6 The Court has found that, even though there was
official police misconduct which amounted to a constitutional viola-
tion, to exclude the evidence from trial would do little or nothing to
deter officers from engaging in such conduct in the future. 10 7 In those
instances the costs are deemed to outweigh the minimal benefits of
exclusion. The exceptions to the exclusionary rule the Supreme Court
has developed are: (1) attenuation or purged taint;10 8 (2) indepen-
dent source; 10 9 and (3) inevitable discovery. 110
The Supreme Court developed these exceptions using an analysis
very similar to the Hudson cost/benefit analysis that determined the
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained in violation of
the knock and announce rule. In these exceptions, as in Hudson, the
Supreme Court held the evidence admissible because the deterrent
benefit is not furthered by excluding the evidence obtained.
1. Attenuation or Purged Taint
Attenuation or purged taint refers to situations where the link
between the illegal search or seizure and the evidence obtained is so
attenuated that the courts conclude that excluding the evidence
would have little, if any, deterrent effect on the police.' 1 ' The test for
105. Id. at 2168.
106. See discussion supra note 24 and accompanying text.
107. See id.
108. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
109. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988); see also Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (recognizing the independent source doc-
trine for the first time).
110. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984).
111. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88.
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its applicability is "whether granting establishment of the primary ille-
gality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently dis-
tinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."112
The Supreme Court has rejected a "but-for" test for determining
admissibility of evidence; it held that evidence is not "'fruit of the poi-
sonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for
the illegal actions of the police."'1 13 "In other words, exclusion may not
be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a 'but-
for' cause of obtaining evidence." 114 A but-for test would have very
broad and far reaching effects in excluding evidence that could have
no meaningful relationship to the initial illegality. Instead, the attenu-
ation exception requires a determination of whether the evidence was
obtained by some "exploitation of that illegality." 15 Only under these
circumstances are the social costs of excluding the evidence out-
weighed by the deterrent effect or incentive for police not to engage
in such conduct. When the evidence is so attenuated from the initial
conduct, the deterrent effect is also similarly attenuated, and exclu-
sion of the evidence is simply not warranted. This evidence is admissi-
ble under the same rationale as the Supreme Court held the evidence
admissible in Hudson-the deterrent benefit is not furthered by its
exclusion. 11 6
2. Independent Source
The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of evi-
dence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful
search, but later obtained independently by lawful activities untainted
by the initial illegality.1 17 Even though evidence may have been ini-
tially unconstitutionally discovered through illegal police conduct, if
the evidence is subsequently uncovered by a lawful means unrelated
to or independent of an earlier tainted one, the evidence will not be
excluded from trial. 1 8
112. Id. at 488.
113. Id.
114. Hudson v. Michigan 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).
115. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.
116. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-68.
117. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
118. Id. at 805.
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In Murray v. United States,119 the police initially made an admit-
tedly illegal entry into the premises but did not disturb anything. a20
They later obtained a valid search warrant for the same premises, but
they did not include any of the information they obtained as a result
of the initial illegal entry in the affidavit for the warrant. 12 1 In uphold-
ing the subsequent search and seizure, the Court reasoned that the
exclusionary rule is designed to put "the police in the same, not a
worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or mis-
conduct had occurred."' 22 To exclude evidence obtained through a
subsequent independent source would "put the police (and society)
not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation oc-
curred, but in a worse one."' 2 3
Applying the cost/benefit analysis, excluding evidence obtained
by a subsequent legal means independent of the illegal conduct would
have little, if any, deterrent effect on future police conduct.124 Exclud-
ing the evidence can hardly make police more likely to engage in law-
ful conduct in the future because the police were already acting
lawfully, at least as to the subsequent search or seizure. Furthermore,
police have little incentive to engage in the illegal conduct in the first
place, since they already have a legal source by which to conduct the
search or seizure. Under these circumstances, the police have more to
lose than to gain from the illegal conduct.
Upon this rationale, the independent source doctrine has been
upheld as an exception to the exclusionary rule.1 2 5 As in the Hudson
cost/benefit analysis, this exception was established because the goal
of the exclusionary rule is not furthered by excluding evidence ob-
tained in this manner.
3. Inevitable Discovery
Another exception to the exclusionary rule is inevitable discov-
ery.126 Under this exception, evidence may be held admissible, even
119. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
120. See id. at 535.
121. See id. at 535-36.
122. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
123. Murray, 487 U.S. at 541.
124. Id. at 544-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "the independent source
exception, like the inevitable discovery exception, is primarily based on a practical view
that under certain circumstances the beneficial deterrent effect that exclusion will have on
future constitutional violations is too slight to justify the social cost of excluding probative
evidence from a criminal trial").
125. Id. at 541-43.
126. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 440-41.
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though obtained by unconstitutional police activity, "[i]f the prosecu-
tion can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the [evi-
dence] ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means."
2 7
In Nix v. Williams,t28 the police found incriminating evidence as a
result of a statement made by a murder suspect in violation of his
Miranda129 warnings. 130 The police were able to demonstrate that they
had planned to search the area where the body was found the next
day, despite the defendant's statement about the location, and would
have found the evidence even without the illegal conduct.13 1 As in
Murray, the Court reasoned that excluding evidence obtained in this
manner would "put the police in a worse position than they would
have been in absent any error or violation.' 32 This is not the goal of
the exclusionary rule. Its goal is to put "the police in the same, not a
worse position."'113
Furthermore, in an inevitable discovery situation, the societal
costs are great, but the deterrent benefits are small. In a similar ratio-
nale to that of the independent source exception, the Supreme Court
has reasoned that excluding evidence under these circumstances can
have little, if any, deterrent effect on police conduct. 34 It is not likely
that excluding evidence that would have inevitably been discovered
absent police misconduct can make police more likely to follow
proper procedures in the future. Furthermore, under these circum-
stances police have little incentive to act illegally in the first place,
since they may not know that evidence will be inevitably discovered.' 3 5
Based on this rationale, evidence obtained in this manner is admissi-
ble at trial and not subject to the exclusionary rule. Even though there
was illegal police conduct, application of the exclusionary rule is sim-
ply not warranted under these circumstances, when the social costs
127. Id. at 444.
128. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
129. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that, prior to custodial inter-
rogation, a suspect be advised that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says
shall be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires). Statements made in violation of Miranda violate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination. Id.
130. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 436.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 443.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 442-46.
135. Id. at 445-46.
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are so great, but the deterrent benefit is small. 136 As in Hudson, the
exclusionary rule is not appropriate because its deterrent goal is not
furthered under these circumstances.
The above mentioned exceptions to the exclusionary rule are all
situations where, although there was unconstitutional conduct on the
part of the police, the evidence was still admissible at trial. Although
each exception involves different circumstances surrounding the
search and seizure, the rationale for admissibility of the evidence is
the same-when applying the cost/benefit analysis, the social costs of
excluding the evidence outweigh the deterrent benefit. As a result,
the Supreme Court held the evidence admissible at trial.
This analysis is the same analysis that the Supreme Court used in
Hudson to find the evidence admissible. These three exceptions to the
exclusionary rule demonstrate that the analysis used in Hudson is not a
new method by which the Supreme Court determines whether the
exclusionary rule should be applied, and that its use in Hudson, al-
though a new result, is not new law.
This is also the same analysis used below to demonstrate that
when the cost/benefit analysis is applied to the exceptions to the
good faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the evidence similarly
should be held admissible. As in these exceptions and in Hudson,
when the cost/benefit analysis is applied to the exceptions to the
good faith exceptions, the costs outweigh the deterrent benefits, and
therefore the evidence should be admissible at trial.
IV. Hudson v. Michigan: The Exclusionary Rule Vis-a-Vis the
Knock and Announce Rule
In Hudson v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court revisited
whether the exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for a knock
and announce violation. In Hudson, police obtained a warrant to
search Booker Hudson's home for drugs and weapons.1 37 After arriv-
ing at Hudson's home, the police knocked and announced their pres-
ence, "but waited only a short time, perhaps 'three to five
seconds, ' " 1 38 before entering Hudson's home. After entering the
home, the police found drugs and a weapon, arrested Hudson, and
136. See generally id. at 434.
137. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
138. Id. at 2162.
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charged him under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm
possession. 13
9
Hudson moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the evi-
dence had been unconstitutionally obtained in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. t40 The Michigan trial court granted his motion. 141
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, rely-
ing on Michigan Supreme Court cases holding that exclusion is inap-
propriate for knock and announce violations if the officers had a valid
warrant.1 42 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 143
The evidence was subsequently introduced at trial against Hudson,
and he was convicted of drug possession. 144 The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court
declined review. 145 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.1 46
A. The Historical Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Knock
and Announce Violations
For years, evidence obtained in violation of the knock and an-
nounce rule was subject to the exclusionary rule and held inadmissi-
ble at trial.' 47 In holding such evidence inadmissible, the Supreme
Court apparently relied on the idea that excluding evidence under
these circumstances furthered the goal of the exclusionary rule-de-
terring future police misconduct. 148
Hudson re-examined this principle and ultimately overturned it.
The court applied the cost/benefit analysis and found that the deter-
rent benefit of excluding evidence obtained in violation of the knock
and announce rule was outweighed by the social costs of exclusion. As
a result, the Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule was not the









147. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958).
148. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1947).
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B. The Exclusionary Rule as Applied in Hudson The Cost/Benefit
Analysis
In Hudson, the Court overruled prior decisions which held that
evidence obtained in violation of the knock and announce rule was
inadmissible.1 49 The Hudson Court maintained, however, that the
knock and announce principle still forms a part of the reasonableness
requirement under the Fourth Amendment, and that evidence ob-
tained in violation of the rule is an unreasonable search and
seizure.15 0 The question in Hudson was merely one of the appropriate
remedy for such violations.1 51 In concluding that evidence obtained as
a result of a violation of the knock and announce rule was admissible
at trial against a defendant, the Court applied the cost/benefit analy-
sis and concluded that the costs outweighed the deterrent benefits of
exclusion. 152
This is the same analysis the Court previously used to determine
whether the exclusionary rule is applicable to knock and announce
violations, but the Hudson Court came to a different result.15 3 When
examining Hudson's cost/benefit analysis, it is clear that this ruling,
which uses well-established principles for application of the exclusion-
ary rule, is not new law. Instead, previous decisions concluding that
knock and announce violations warrant exclusion of evidence were
inconsistent with these well-established principles.
1. The Costs of Excluding Evidence Obtained in Violation of the
Knock and Announce Rule
In applying the cost/benefit analysis to a knock and announce
violation, as the Court did in Hudson,'5 4 analysis begins with the social
costs of excluding the evidence. The Hudson Court viewed the costs as
"considerable," 15 5 as in any case when there is a risk of "setting the
guilty free and the dangerous at large."'1 5 6
149. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968) (holding that because of-
ficers entered without a proper knock and announcement, the subsequent arrest was inva-
lid, and the evidence seized in the subsequent search was inadmissible); Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (holding that because "the petitioner did not receive
that notice before the officers broke the door to invade his home, the arrest was unlawful,
and the evidence seized should have been suppressed").
150. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2173.
151. See id. at 2163 (stating that "the issue here is remedy").
152. See id. at 2165-68.
153. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
154. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-67.
155. Id. at 2165.
156. Id. at 2163.
Winter 2008] HU)DSON V MICHIGAN
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
In particular, one cost of excluding evidence obtained as a result
of a knock and announce violation is that it would generate a constant
flood of defendants claiming alleged failures to observe the rule, and
claims that any asserted Richards v. Wisconsin157 justifications for a no-
knock entry had inadequate support.158 In other words, proving that
an officer complied with the knock and announce rule may be diffi-
cult, and many defendants will argue noncompliance with the rule in
order to exclude evidence.
"Unlike the warrant or Miranda requirements, compliance with
which is readily determined (either there was or was not a warrant;
either the Miranda warning was given, or it was not),'1 59 compliance
with the knock and announce rule is not so straightforward. It is much
more difficult to determine what constituted a "reasonable wait
time"' 60 in a particular case (or how many seconds the police in fact
waited), or whether there was "reasonable suspicion" of the sort that
would invoke the Richards exceptions. 16' Unlike the Miranda or war-
rant requirement, compliance with the knock and announce rule is
much more "difficult for the trial court to determine and even more
difficult for an appellate court to review."' 62
As a result of these difficulties in proving compliance with the
knock and announce rule, defendants are likely to prevail more often,
resulting not only in opening the floodgates of litigation, but also in
more acquittals of defendants due to the exclusion of the evidence.
Indeed, this is a substantial cost to society. Furthermore, there is also
fear that if officers know that noncompliance (such as not waiting a
reasonable time) will result in the exclusion of evidence, then officers
may refrain from making a timely entry after knocking and announc-
ing resulting in destruction of evidence and danger to the officers. 163
157. 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (justifying a no-knock entry when the police have reason-
able suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circum-
stances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of
the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence).
158. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
159. Id.
160. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003).




2. The Deterrent Benefits of Excluding Evidence Obtained in
Violation of the Knock and Announce Rule
When examining the deterrent benefit of excluding evidence, it
is essential to begin with an examination of the context of the viola-
tion. Prior to a knock and announce violation, it is evident that the
police officer has already acted reasonably in a number of ways: the
officer has conducted an investigation and has established probable
cause for a search or an arrest; the officer has properly prepared an
affidavit demonstrating those facts; and the officer has presented the
affidavit to a magistrate who, satisfied that probable cause exists, has
issued a warrant. Armed with the warrant, the officer goes to the resi-
dence to execute it. At this point, the violation occurs by either (1)
failing to knock and announce altogether; (2) failing to wait a reason-
able amount of time after announcement prior to forcibly entering;
1 6 4
or (3) using unnecessary or an unreasonable amount of force to make
the entry after refusal.165
As a result of one of these violations, the evidence is now uncon-
stitutionally obtained due to the mere manner in which the search or
seizure was made. The question then becomes what deterrent effect
would excluding the evidence have on an officer's future conduct.
What should the officer do differently next time?
The goal of the Fourth Amendment is to insure that officers act
reasonably. 16 6 At the very core of reasonable conduct is obtaining a
warrant supported by probable cause.1 67 The officer who fails to
knock and announce has already obtained a valid warrant, supported
by probable cause, before the illegal entry into the home. Exclusion of
the evidence certainly cannot cause the officer to act more reasonably
prior to entry into the home. Thus, at this stage, the deterrent benefits
are minimal in comparison to the costs.
There may be, however, more of a deterrent effect with respect to
the manner in which the search or seizure is conducted. The mere
fact that probable cause exists or the fact that the officer has a warrant
does not give him or her the freedom to execute the search or seizure
in any way that he or she chooses. If the officer violates the knock and
164. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 983 (6th Cir. 2000).
165. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1984).
166. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990) ("It is apparent that in order
to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally de-
manded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the
government... is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.").
167. See id.
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announce rule, excluding the evidence obtained as a result thereof
would certainly have a deterrent effect in this respect. For instance, if
an officer knows that by bursting into a home in order to execute a
warrant, the evidence obtained will be excluded, this should influence
him or her to comply with the rule on the next execution. So there is
some deterrent effect with respect to the manner of execution, even
though the officer has acted reasonably in many ways prior to the vio-
lation. It is also worth pointing out that, even though the officer has
acted unreasonably with respect to the manner of execution, the of-
ficer has complied with the Fourth Amendment's most important re-
quirement for reasonableness-obtaining a valid warrant. 168 Analysis
does not end here, though-courts consider additional factors when
analyzing the deterrent effect.
In Hudson, the Supreme Court also considered the strength of
the incentive to violate the rule as a relevant factor in analyzing the
deterrent benefit of exclusion. It held that "the value of deterrence
depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden
act" in the first place. 169 In other words, is application of the exclu-
sionary rule needed to deter police from such conduct, or is the con-
duct in question of the type that police will have little if any incentive
in which to engage? In the case of a knock and announce violation,
police have more to lose than to gain from violation of the rule. Be-
cause the officers had a warrant, they would have obtained the evi-
dence anyway-even without the knock and announce violation. 170
Thus, they will gain nothing more by failing to knock and announce;
by violating the rule they actually risk the exclusion of the evidence
from trial. Officers also risk injury to themselves and others when they
fail to knock and announce.171 Officers thus have little incentive to
violate the knock and announce rule, and, therefore, exclusion of the
evidence is not needed to deter the future misconduct.
The final factor the Court considered in evaluating the deterrent
benefit is whether there are alternative means of deterrence if exclu-
sion is not imposed.172 One possibility is that an officer may be sub-
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring a warrant for compliance with the Reasona-
bleness Clause).
169. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).
170. "Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have
executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs
inside the house." Id. at 2164.
171. Id. at 2165.
172. See id. at 2166-68.
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jected to civil liability.1 73 Civil suits may be brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983174 for violations of constitutional rights.1 75 There are also new
laws that have opened the civil courts as a viable means of resolving
violations of civil rights, 176 and these laws may offer the deterrent ben-
efit in the absence of application of the exclusionary rule. These laws
were not available in the early days of the exclusionary rule as a rem-
edy for such violations. This may have been a factor in why the exclu-
sionary rule was not needed then to further deterrence.
The Hudson Court also noted that "[a] nother development over
the past half-century that deters civil rights violations is the increasing
professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal
police discipline.' 1 77 Increased training of officers and increased in-
ternal disciplinary measures, not in place when the exclusionary rule
was adopted, serve as valuable deterrents for police, alleviating the
need for exclusion of evidence to serve the deterrent goals.
3. The Costs of Exclusion Outweigh the Benefits
Weighing the substantial social costs associated with applying the
exclusionary rule to a knock and announce violation against the mini-
mal deterrent effect of its application, exclusion is not appropriate
because the costs outweigh the deterrent benefits. The exclusionary
rule has never been applied except "where its deterrence benefits out-
weigh its 'substantial social costs." 78 This rationale, used in Hudson,
is the same rationale that courts have used in establishing all the ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule. 179 It is not new law to refuse to apply
the exclusionary rule after conducting the cost/benefit analysis and
ultimately finding that the social costs outweigh the deterrent bene-
fits. Hudson is not new law; it merely applied longstanding legal princi-
ples and reached a different result when it considered modern day
factors as part of the cost/benefit analysis.
173. Id.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
175. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166-68; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that "[e]very
person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress").
176. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (authorizing attorneys fees for the prevailing
party in civil rights actions).
177. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168.
178. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (White,J. dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
179. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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V. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Warrant
Hudson demonstrates the Court's intention to only apply the ex-
clusionary rule when the deterrent benefits outweigh the social costs
of exclusion. Strictly applying the cost/benefit analysis, the Hudson
Court arrived at a different result than in previous knock and an-
nounce cases, but it remained consistent with well-established princi-
ples for application of the exclusionary rule.
Similarly, evidence has traditionally been excluded when an of-
ficer reasonably relied on a warrant later held invalid, when certain
exceptions existed. Applying the cost/benefit analysis to those excep-
tions, as the Court did in Hudson, it is clear that the evidence should
not be excluded because exclusion does not further the deterrent
goal of the rule. A close examination of the costs and benefits of ex-
clusion in this context demonstrates that application of the rule is not
warranted.
A. Overview of the Exception
In addition to the exceptions to the exclusionary rule outlined
above, there is another situation where application of the exclusionary
rule has been held inapplicable: the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule when an officer reasonably relies on a warrant later held
invalid. 180 In United States v. Leon,181 the United States Supreme Court
held that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be
applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evi-
dence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate," but which is
ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.18 2 Even
though the evidence was obtained as a result of an invalid warrant, a
technically unconstitutional search and seizure, the Court held the
evidence admissible if the officer reasonably believed the warrant is-
sued was valid.' 83
The rationale for admissibility of the evidence obtained under
these circumstances is the same as that for admitting evidence under
the previously discussed exceptions to the exclusionary rule and in
Hudson. As in those instances, when applying the cost/benefit analysis,
180. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
181. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
182. Id. at 905-25.
183. Id.
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the costs of exclusion outweigh the deterrent benefit, so the evidence
is admissible. 184 The Court reasoned that when evidence is excluded
after an officer has acted in reasonable reliance upon a warrant issued
by a judge, even when later held invalid, excluding the evidence will
have minimal, if not nonexistent, deterrent effect on the officer who
has done all that he or she should have done under the Fourth
Amendment. 185 As a result, the deterrent benefit is outweighed by the
social costs and the exclusionary rule is not applicable.
In Leon, police prepared an affidavit and presented it to a judge
who found that probable cause existed and issued a warrant for the
arrest of the suspect.1 86 The warrant was executed, but it was later
found not to be supported by probable cause.1 87 After a finding that
the officers had reasonably relied upon the validity of the warrant, the
United States Supreme Court held that although the warrant was not
supported by probable cause, "exclusion [was] inappropriate. 1 8 8 The
Court reasoned that excluding evidence obtained by officers acting in
good faith reliance upon the validity of a warrant does not further the
deterrent goal of the exclusionary rule, and the rule is therefore inap-
plicable under these circumstances.' 89
In a case such as Leon, an officer has conducted an investigation
and has presented his or her findings, which he or she believes consti-
tute probable cause, in a sworn affidavit to the judge. The judge then
finds that the affidavit does, in fact, constitute probable cause, and
issues a warrant based thereon. The officer then executes the warrant
within its scope. Thereafter, the warrant is found not to be supported
by probable cause making the search technically an unconstitutional
search or seizure. The officer, in this instance, has done all that is
required of him or her under the Fourth Amendment. All that he or
she could have done differently is to disbelieve the judge, which
clearly he should not be required to do.190 Here, the error clearly lies
184. See id. at 906-07, where the Court addressed the question of whether the exclu-
sionary rule should apply when an officer relies on a warrant later held invalid and stated
that "it must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the
prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance
on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to
be defective."
185. Id. at 901-05.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 926.
189. Id.
190. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984) (holding that "an
officer is not required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by
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with the issuing judge, not the officer, for it is the judge's responsibil-
ity to make probable cause determinations 91 after the officer has con-
ducted an investigation and presented his or her findings in a sworn
affidavit. 192 When the judge has erred, excluding the evidence does
not further the rule's goal of deterring an officer's conduct. The rule
is not designed to deter the judge's conduct, for the judge has no
stake in the outcome of a criminal trial, unlike the officer who is often
said to be engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."1 93 Since the costs of excluding the evidence in this situation
outweigh the minimal, if not nonexistent, deterrent benefits of exclu-
sion, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable.
This analysis and application of the cost/benefit analysis is consistent
with the Court's rationale in Hudson and the other exceptions to the
exclusionary rule.
This good faith exception does have one essential requirement-
the police officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause deter-
mination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues
must be objectively reasonable.1 94 The officer must in fact have acted
in good faith, i.e., he must possess a reasonable belief that the warrant
was a valid warrant supported by probable cause.19 5 The exception will
only apply if reasonable minds could differ on the validity of the
warrant. 1
96
As a result of the Fourth Amendment requirement that an officer
must act reasonably, the Court has established four exceptions to this
good faith exception in which the exclusionary rule will apply. The
Court reasons that when these circumstances are present, application
of the exclusionary rule is appropriate, and the evidence obtained as a
result of the invalid warrant should be held inadmissible at trial. The
exceptions to the good faith exception are: (1) a "facially deficient"
warrant, 97 (2) the issuing judge "wholly abandoned his judicial
role,"19 8 (3) the affidavit was clearly insufficient to establish probable
action, that the warrant he possesses authorized him to conduct the search he has
requested").
191. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that warrants be issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate upon probable cause and supported by oath or affirmation).
192. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
193. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
194. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984).
195. See id. at 919.
196. See id. at 914, 919.




19 9 and (4) the warrant contains misleading information.200 The
rationale is that when these circumstances are present, the officer's
conduct is not reasonable, and the evidence should be excluded from
trial. 201
Applying the Hudson analysis, however, to the four exceptions,
the evidence should be admissible in three of the four instances.
Under those circumstances, excluding evidence does not serve the
goal of deterrence, so the benefits of exclusion are outweighed by the
social costs.
B. Application of the Cost/Benefit Analysis to the Exceptions to
the Good Faith Exception: Warrant
Application of the Hudson analysis begins with assessing the costs
to society when evidence is excluded from trial against a defendant.
There are always "substantial social costs" whenever evidence is ex-
cluded from trial which could include "setting the guilty free and the
dangerous at large." 20 2 Another import concern of excluding evi-
dence is that it "allows lawbreaking officers to go unpunished, ' 20 3
which results in loss of respect for the criminal justice system. When
these social costs are weighed against the minimal deterrent benefit of
exclusion in each of the exceptions below, it is apparent that the ex-
clusionary rule is not always warranted.
1. Insufficient Affidavit
The first exception to this good faith exception is when an affida-
vit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable." 20 4 The Court reasons that
when an affidavit is clearly insufficient to establish probable cause,
then the reasonableness and good faith required for applicability of
the good faith exception are not present, and the good faith excep-
tion does not apply.205 If reasonable minds would all agree that proba-
ble cause does not exist, then an officer would not be reasonable in
his or her belief that the warrant was a valid warrant, and evidence
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
201. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (holding that when an officer's reliance on the magis-
trate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, "application of the ex-
treme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate").
202. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006).
203. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 267 (1973).
204. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)).
205. See id.
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obtained as a result of the search would be subject to the exclusionary
rule.
This rationale, however, overlooks one important factor-the
search or seizure is not being conducted merely on the insufficient
affidavit. The affidavit is presented to a judge, who makes a finding
that it does establish probable cause and issues a warrant based
thereon. If the judge makes a finding that an affidavit establishes
probable cause, an officer should not be required to challenge this
conclusion. Furthermore, excluding the evidence would not deter the
officer's future conduct. When an officer relies upon a warrant, the
officer has acted reasonably in a number of ways-he or she has con-
ducted an investigation, prepared an affidavit of findings, and
presented it to a judge who believed it constituted probable cause.
Assuming he then executes it in a reasonable manner within its scope,
it is unlikely that excluding evidence obtained from such a search
would deter any future misconduct. This officer has done nothing
wrong. Since the social costs of exclusion will outweigh the minimal if
any deterrent benefit, under the cost/benefit analysis used in Hudson,
the evidence should be admitted.
2. Issuing Judge Abandons Judicial Role
Another exception to this good faith exception is when a judge
has "wholly abandoned" his or her detached and neutral judicial
role. 206 The Court pointed out that when this occurs, "no reasonably
well-trained officer should rely on the warrant." 20 7 This happens when
ajudge is not acting as a detached and neutral magistrate, but instead
he or she is acting in a similar capacity to that of an officer, engaged
in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crimes."20 8
The leading case on this issue is Lo-Ji Sales v. New York. 209 In this
case, the Court held that the judge "allowed himself to become a
member, if not the leader, of the search party."210 The Court rea-
soned that evidence obtained when the judge has abandoned his or
her judicial role is inadmissible because the officer who relies on a
warrant issued by such a judge is not acting in good faith, and the
evidence subsequently obtained is therefore inadmissible. 21 1 Under
206. Id. at 923.
207. Id.
208. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
209. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
210. Id. at 327.
211. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
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those circumstances, excluding evidence is very unlikely to affect the
officer's future conduct. Excluding this evidence has no effect on po-
lice conduct because the officer has acted reasonably in conducting
an investigation, presenting a warrant supported by probable cause to
a judge, and then executing it within its scope. Excluding this evi-
dence has no deterrent effect on an officer who has done nothing
wrong. It is the judge who has stepped out of his or her role. Since the
deterrent benefit is minimal in such a case, the benefits are out-
weighed by the social costs of exclusion. Under Hudson's cost/benefit
analysis, this evidence should be admissible at trial.
3. Facially Deficient Warrant
Another exception to this good faith exception exists when a war-
rant is facially deficient. The Leon Court held that "a warrant may be
so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be
searched or the things to be seized-that the executing officers can-
not reasonably presume it to be valid."212 The facially deficient excep-
tion refers to insufficiency regarding the particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.2 13 If the warrant fails to particularly describe
the persons to be searched or the persons or things to be seized, then
the exception to the good faith exception is applicable because the
warrant is presumed to be invalid on its face, and the courts presume
the executing officer's should have known it.214
There is a valid argument that this exception to the good faith
exception could have a deterrent effect on police. If a warrant is
clearly insufficient, then excluding evidence obtained as a result
thereof can deter police from seeking and subsequently executing
such a warrant. This exception, however, is similar to the facially defi-
cient affidavit exception. The United States Supreme Court has held
that "an officer is [not] required to disbelieve a judge who has just
advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses au-
thorizes him to conduct the search he has requested." 215 When the
officer has relied on the direction of the judge, his conduct is "reason-
able," which is what the Constitution requires. Therefore, in this in-
stance, like the other exceptions to the good faith exception, the costs
212. Id.
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
214. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; cf Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90
(1984) (finding that an officer acted reasonably in reliance on a facially deficient warrant).
215. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-90.
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outweigh the deterrent benefit. Therefore, applying the cost/benefit
analysis, as it was applied in Hudson, exclusion is not warranted.
4. Misleading Information
The final exception to this good faith exception is when an of-
ficer has provided misleading information to the judge upon which to
establish probable cause. This occurs when the magistrate who issued
the warrant "was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard of the truth."21 6
The good faith exception does not apply here, even in light of
Hudson. Unlike the other exceptions to this good faith exception, ex-
cluding evidence here will have a strong deterrent effect on future
police conduct. In this situation, an officer has intentionally or reck-
lessly represented facts to the judge regarding probable cause. If the
evidence obtained as a result of these misrepresentations is excluded,
the officer would have an incentive not to engage in such conduct in
the future. In this case, the deterrent benefit outweighs the social
costs of exclusion. This is exactly the type of situation that the exclu-
sionary rule was designed to address. Therefore, the good faith excep-
tion is not applicable and the exclusionary rule is appropriate because
here the deterrent benefit outweighs the social costs. Under this anal-
ysis, applied as it was in Hudson, this evidence should be excluded
from trial.
C. Hudson Clearly Supports Admissibility of Evidence
Of the four exceptions to the good faith exception, only when an
officer provides misleading information to the judge that the officer
knew or should have known was false, will exclusion likely deter his or
her future conduct. Since the deterrent benefit is great as compared
to the social costs, the evidence should be inadmissible under the
Hudson analysis. The exclusionary rule, however, is not the appropri-
ate remedy in the other three exceptions where the deterrent benefit
is minimal in comparison to the social costs.
The Court in Hudson reasoned that, although admitting evidence
obtained in violation of the knock and announce rule was a significant
change in the law, the conclusion relied on well-established principles
216. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
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that had historically been applied to render a different result.2 17 Here,
even though this evidence has traditionally been excluded, if well-es-
tablished principles regarding application of the exclusionary rule are
applied, the evidence should be held admissible as not furthering the
goal of the exclusionary rule. Like Hudson, this would appear to be a
significant change in the law regarding admissibility of this evidence,
but it is not new law. As in Hudson, this is the same test that has histori-
cally been applied to determine application of the exclusionary rule
with a different result upon a more thorough application of the cost/
benefit analysis.
VI. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Statutory Authority
A. Overview of the Exception
In Illinois v. Krull,218 the United States Supreme Court held that a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should also be recog-
nized when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a stat-
ute later held unconstitutional. 219 As in Leon, the Krull Court reasoned
that an officer who reasonably relies on a statute later found to be
unconstitutional has done nothing wrong, so excluding the evidence
can have no deterrent effect on his future conduct.220 Like the judge
in the good faith exception to an invalid warrant, here it is the legisla-
ture that is in error. The legislature, like the judge, has no real stake
in the prosecution and cannot be deterred by the threat of exclusion
of evidence. As in Hudson, the Court held the costs of exclusion out-
weigh the benefits, and the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in this
context.221
In establishing this good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
the Court again pointed out exceptions where the exclusionary rule
should apply. In the first instance, the Court held that "a statute can-
not support objectively reasonable reliance if, in passing the statute,
the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitu-
217. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958); see also United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (applying the cost/benefit analysis to determine
whether application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate); Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (holding that application of exclusionary rule would turn on
balancing costs and benefits of exclusion).
218. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
219. Id. at 347, 359-61.
220. See id. at 352.
221. See zd. at 349-59.
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tional laws."'22 2 Secondly, the Court held that the exception is not ap-
plicable if the statutory provision is such that a reasonable law
enforcement officer should have known that the statute was unconsti-
tutional. 22 3 In both of these situations, the officer is deemed to have
acted in bad faith, so the Court reasons that the good faith exception
is not applicable, and the evidence should be excluded from trial.
Applying the Hudson cost/benefit analysis, however, it is clear
that this evidence should not be excluded from trial. As in the case of
an officer who reasonably relies upon an invalid warrant, when an of-
ficer reasonably relies upon a statute later held unconstitutional, the
minimal deterrent benefit is substantially outweighed by the social
costs. Therefore, the evidence should be admissible.
B. Application of the Cost/Benefit Analysis to the Exceptions to
the Good Faith Exception: Statutory Authority
The costs of excluding evidence obtained when an officer relies
upon statutory authority are great. As in the case of relying on a war-
rant, the costs here are heightened by the fact that the evidence is
being excluded from trial after being obtained by an officer who rea-
sonably relied upon statutory authority. Relying on statutory authority
removes the fear that officers will instead rely on their own colored
perceptions in making probable cause determinations. Removing of-
ficer discretion is at the very core of the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.2 24 Here, there is similarly a neutral and objective party
who has provided the authority upon which the officer relies. When
evidence is excluded under these circumstances, resulting in the
guilty going free, the costs to society are great.
1. Legislature Wholly Abandons Responsibility to Enact
Constitutional Laws
The Court has ruled that if the legislature "wholly abandoned its
responsibility to enact constitutional laws" at the time the statute was
passed, then the evidence obtained by an officer in reasonable reli-
ance thereon should be excluded.2 25 Excluding this evidence, how-
ever, can have little if any deterrent effect on the officer who has in
good faith relied upon statutory authority. The officer has acted prop-
222. Id. at 355.
223. Id.
224. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that warrants be issued by a de-
tached and neutral magistrate upon probable cause and supported by oath or affirmation).
225. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355.
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erly in relying on the statute. This is what he or she should have done.
In Krull, the Court held that application of the exclusionary rule can-
not be justified on the basis of deterring legislative misconduct.226
The Court reiterated that police, not legislators, are the focus of the
rule.2 27 An exception that makes the exclusionary rule applicable
when the legislature abandons its legislative role ignores the purpose
of the rule. It is the police not the legislature whose perceptions are
sometimes colored in making probable cause determinations because
they are the ones who are engaged in the "competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." 228
Based on this analysis, there is little or no deterrent benefit to
gain in excluding this evidence from trial. When weighed against the
costs society suffers in excluding this evidence, the costs simply out-
weigh the benefits. Under Hudson's cost/benefit analysis, this would
warrant admissibility of the evidence.
2. Reasonable Officer Should have Known the Statute Was
Unconstitutional
Similarly, the social costs outweigh the deterrent benefits of ex-
clusion in the second exception to this good faith exception. This situ-
ation exists when the statutory provision on which the officer relies, is
such that a reasonable law enforcement officer should have known
that the statute was unconstitutional. 229
Only in the rarest of circumstances, however, could an officer be
charged with reasonably believing a duly acted statute is unconstitu-
tional and thus, reasonably disregard it. "Before assuming office, state
legislators are required to take an oath to support the Federal Consti-
tution."230 Even the "courts presume that legislatures act in a constitu-
tional manner."231 An officer would not be justified in disregarding
the legislature's determination of the constitutionality of a statute.
An officer must follow the law as it is written.232 Reliance on a
statute is just the type of objectively reasonable conduct that is most
desirable from law enforcement, rather than having them make prob-
able cause determinations themselves. This is no different than the
226. Id. at 354-55.
227. Id.
228. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
229. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355.
230. Id. at 351.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 350.
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rationale for requiring a detached and neutral magistrate to issue war-
rants. The goal is to remove the discretion from the officer who is
often engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crimes."233 It seems that it would be better for officers to rely on a
statute authorizing their conduct than upon their own conclusions
and observations.
Based on this analysis, an officer will not likely be deterred from
future misconduct when evidence is excluded in this context. As in
the case of a warrant later held invalid, here the officer has done all
that he or she can do to act reasonably. If this evidence is excluded,
there is nothing more that he or she can do differently in the next
instance other than to disbelieve the legislature and act on his or her
own accord. The deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule is simply
not furthered in this context. Since the social costs outweigh the de-
terrent benefits, admitting the evidence is appropriate.
Conclusion
The exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy for constitu-
tional violations. In developing this remedy, the United States Su-
preme Court has continued to carefully justify it and carve out the
circumstances providing for its applicability. The Court has been care-
ful in its application, and it has been clear that the rule should only be
applied when the deterrent benefits of exclusion outweigh the social
costs of exclusion. The Court strictly applied the cost/benefit analysis
in Hudson to find that evidence obtained in violation of the knock and
announce rule should not be excluded from trial because the social
costs of exclusion outweigh the minimal deterrent benefit of exclud-
ing such evidence. Although Hudson overruled prior decisions which
excluded this evidence, the Hudson ruling is consistent with well-estab-
lished principles that have created a number of exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule, including the good faith exceptions.
Similarly, when Hudson's cost/benefit analysis is applied to the
exceptions to the good faith exceptions, the exclusionary rule should
not be applied. When an officer reasonably relies upon a warrant is-
sued by a magistrate later held invalid or upon a statute later held
unconstitutional, he or she has acted reasonably, as the Fourth
Amendment requires. When the judge or the legislature, and not the
officer, has acted improperly, application of the rule can have no real
effect on the officer's future conduct. Since the deterrent benefit is
233. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
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minimal and the social costs great, the evidence should be admissible,
as in Hudson. If the goal of the rule is not furthered, the rule should
not be applied.
As in Hudson, admitting evidence obtained in violation of the ex-
ceptions to the good faith exceptions would appear to change the law,
but it does not. As demonstrated in the above analysis of the excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule, the Court has for many years only ex-
cluded evidence when deterrent benefits are furthered by exclusion
of the evidence. That analysis has not changed. In Hudson, the Court
strictly applied the cost/benefit analysis taking into account all rele-
vant factors necessary to adequately assess both the costs and bene-
fits-including new law and policies-to conclude that when a knock
and announce violation has occurred, the costs outweigh the benefits,
and the evidence should be admissible. Hudson signals the end of any
arbitrary application of the exclusionary rule, and it clarifies the cir-
cumstances under which the exclusionary rule is appropriately ap-
plied. Based on that analysis, the exclusionary rule is not the
appropriate remedy for the exceptions to the good faith exceptions to
the exclusionary rule, and the evidence should be admissible at trial.
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